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1. Introduction 
The  long-run  relationship  between  fiscal  variables  and  sovereign  bond  yields 
constitutes part of policymakers’ conventional wisdom. Increases in the debt ratio or in 
the  government  deficit  ratio  may  imply  an  increase  in  long-term  interest  rates,  by 
impinging negatively on credit risk and on the quality of the outstanding debt. Under 
such  conditions  market  participants  perceive  an  additional  risk  stemming  from  the 
loosening of fiscal stance (Ardagna et al., 2004), while liquidity risk also plays a role 
notably in times of market unrest (Beber et al., 2009).
1 Moreover, fiscal developments 
are relevant determinants of sovereign ratings (Afonso et al., 2010). 
We  assess  the  long-run  determinants  of  real  long-term  sovereign  yields  in  the 
OECD employing a dynamic panel approach to test for the existence of cointegration. 
Furthermore, we also consider cross-country dependence (for instance, common fiscal 
behaviour,  notably  in  the  European  Union,  financial  markets’  integration  and 
liberalisation,  business  cycle  synchronization),  and  estimate  a  complete  panel  error-
correction model to uncover the short-run parameters. Results show that budgetary and 
external imbalances and inflation determine sovereign yields. 
 
2. Methodology 
The specification for the real long-term sovereign yield, r, is  
  ( ) it it it i i it it r i X u p a g = - = + + .  (1) 
where i is the long-term nominal sovereign yield, p is the inflation rate, and X includes 
additional explanatory variables. i denotes the country, t indicates the period, ai stands 
for the individual effects for each country i, and the disturbances uit follow the standard 
assumptions.  
An error-correction form for the real long-term interest rates is given by  
  1 1 1
1
( ) ( ) ( )
k
it it i j it j it j j it j it it i it it
j
i i X i X v p a b p q d p g - - - - - -
=
    D - = + D - + D + - - +     ∑  (2) 
where the disturbances vit follow the standard assumptions. 
Among the several long-run factors influencing the long-term sovereign yields, we 
consider the budget balance ratio, the debt ratio, the current account balance ratio, and 
inflation. 
                                                 
1 See Orr, Edey, and Kennedy (1995), Codogno et al. (2003), and Laubach (2009).   3 
Since  with  high  inflation  governments  can  partially  inflate  away  fiscal 
indebtedness, the need for a higher nominal and real long-term bond yields cannot be 
discarded. Therefore, we build a measure of inflation surprises (p
e) taking the difference 
between actual inflation and a 2-year moving average of past inflation. 
Moreover,  external  imbalances  are  linked  to  fiscal  imbalances,  notably  when 
private savings do not increase sufficiently to offset the effects of higher budget deficits, 
therefore, impinging via such channel also on long-term bond yields.  
 
3. Analysis 
For the period 1973-2008 we consider the following countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands, 
Portugal, Sweden, Spain, UK, Canada, Japan, and U.S.
2 
To  test  for  cross-section  dependence  we  use  the  test  of  Pesaran  (2004)  by 
computing the Cross section Dependence statistic, and we can reject the null of cross-
section  independence.  Moreover,  using  a  2
nd generation  unit  root  test  from  Pesaran 
(2007), with the null being the unit root, results support the existence of a unit root in all 
series.
3 
We then apply the bootstrap panel cointegration test of Westerlund and Edgerton 
(2007), which accommodates correlation within and between individual cross-sections. 
In case of non-rejection of the null, we can assume that there is cointegration between 
real long-term interest rates and their determinants. 
The  asymptotic  test  results  (Table  1)  indicate  the  absence  of  cointegration. 
However, this is computed on the assumption of cross-sectional independence, not the 
case in our panel. Consequently, we also used bootstrap critical values. In this case we 
conclude that there is a long-run relationship between real long-term interest rates and 
their determinants, implying that over the longer run real they move together.  
 
 
                                                 
2 Government Bond Yield, IFS 61.Z.F, International Financial Statistics (IFS), IMF. Consumer Price 
Index, IFS 64.XZF, IFS, IMF. Government debt ratio, 1.0.319.0.UDGGL, European Commission (EC) 
AMECO.  Budget  balance-to-GDP  ratio,  1.0.319.0.UBLGE,  EC  AMECO.  GDP  at  market  prices, 
1.0.0.0.UVGD,  EC  AMECO.  Current  Balance,  %  of  GDP,  CBGDPR,  Balance  of  Payments,  OECD 
Economic Outlook. 
3 Results are available from the authors. Trending turned out not to be very pronounced and the results are 
not very sensitive to the inclusion of a trend in addition to a constant in the estimated equation. We also 
checked  using  the  tests  of  Pesaran  (2007)  and  the  bootstrap  tests  of  Smith  et  al.  (2004)  that  first 
differences are stationary.   4 
Table 1 – Panel cointegration between Real Long-Term Interest Rates and determinants 
(with a constant) 
 
 





e, CA, DR)  7.430  0.000  0.840 
X2= (Π
e, CA, GBR)  7.385  0.000  0.782 
Notes: bootstrap based on 2000 replications. 
a - null hypothesis: cointegration of Real Long-Term Interest Rates and determinant series. 
# Test based on Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). 
 
Therefore,  we  estimate  the  system  of  long-run  relationships  (one  by  country), 
given by equation (1), by the Zellner approach to handle cross-sectional dependence 
using  the  SUR  estimator.  Results  in  Table  2  show  that  real  sovereign  yields  are 
statistically and positively affected by changes in the debt ratio in 12 countries. Inflation 
has a statistically significant negative effect on real long-term interest rates in ten cases. 
Since  improvements  in  the  external  balance  reduce  real  sovereign  yields  in  ten 
countries,  the  deterioration  of  current  account  balances  may  signal  a  widening  gap 
between savings and investment, pushing long-term interest rates upwards. Moreover, 
when the budget balance ratio is used (Table 3) a better fiscal balance reduces the real 
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Table 2 – SUR estimation, X1= (Π
e, CA, DR) 
Country  Coefficients   t-Statistic  Probab.  Country  Coefficients   t-Statistic  Probab. 
Austria  const  7.305  11.510  0.000  Luxembourg  const  -0.935  -17.980  0.000 
  Π
e  -0.717  -13.415  0.000    Π
e  0.231  6.819  0.000 
  CA  -0.304  -9.177  0.000    CA  0.063  1.351  0.177 
  DR  -0.029  -3.244  0.001    DR  4.256  6.416  0.000 
Belgium  const  1.050  1.598  0.111  Netherlands  const  -0.521  -10.642  0.000 
  Π
e  -0.576  -12.520  0.000    Π
e  -0.309  -7.084  0.000 
  CA  -0.772  -17.248  0.000    CA  0.038  4.414  0.000 
  DR  0.065  12.607  0.000    DR  0.005  0.003  0.998 
Canada  const  1.858  1.940  0.053  Portugal  const  -0.460  -11.272  0.000 
  Π
e  -0.377  -6.455  0.000    Π
e  0.386  6.071  0.000 
  CA  -0.226  -4.541  0.000    CA  0.140  5.447  0.000 
  DR  0.049  4.776  0.000    DR  11.491  6.876  0.000 
Denmark  const  0.281  0.436  0.663  Spain  const  -0.853  -11.572  0.000 
  Π
e  0.039  0.573  0.567    Π
e  0.561  7.068  0.000 
  CA  -0.250  -3.375  0.001    CA  -0.033  -1.336  0.182 
  DR  0.080  10.204  0.000    DR  2.351  2.558  0.011 
Finland  const  11.673  14.894  0.000  Sweden  const  -0.545  -8.673  0.000 
  Π
e  -1.123  -17.669  0.000    Π
e  -0.330  -4.807  0.000 
  CA  -0.389  -8.224  0.000    CA  0.087  7.253  0.000 
  DR  -0.068  -4.125  0.000    DR  4.899  5.235  0.000 
France  const  11.197  16.550  0.000  UK  const  -0.578  -18.412  0.000 
  Π
e  -0.773  -18.527  0.000    Π
e  0.305  3.717  0.000 
  CA  -0.414  -6.566  0.000    CA  0.040  2.211  0.027 
  DR  -0.104  -8.965  0.000    DR  7.897  18.106  0.000 
Germany  const  8.093  16.096  0.000  Japan  const  -0.879  -28.964  0.000 
  Π
e  -0.663  -13.594  0.000    Π
e  -0.152  -1.593  0.112 
  CA  -0.064  -2.186  0.029    CA  -0.036  -9.675  0.000 
  DR  -0.053  -6.574  0.000    DR  11.484  11.167  0.000 
Ireland  const  0.346  0.875  0.382  U.S.  const  -0.932  -19.099  0.000 
  Π
e  -0.530  -16.331  0.000    Π
e  0.331  5.057  0.000 
  CA  -0.204  -5.620  0.000    CA  -0.064  -4.265  0.000 
  DR  0.079  18.191  0.000    DR  -0.935  -17.980  0.000 
Italy  const  -0.133  -0.063  0.950           
  Π
e  -0.383  -5.349  0.000           
  CA  0.086  0.808  0.420           
  DR  0.062  3.494  0.001           
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Table 3 – SUR estimation, X2= (Π
e, CA, GBR) 
Country  Coefficients   t-Statistic  Probab.  Country  Coefficients   t-Statistic  Probab. 
Austria  const  4.815  15.391  0.000  Luxembourg  const  3.852  8.346  0.000 
  Π
e  -0.488  -9.391  0.000    Π
e  -0.964  -21.013  0.000 
  CA  -0.286  -6.190  0.000    CA  0.206  6.006  0.000 
  GBR  -0.080  -1.233  0.218    GBR  -0.021  -0.421  0.674 
Belgium  const  5.441  14.197  0.000  Netherlands  const  5.494  13.366  0.000 
  Π
e  -0.844  -19.923  0.000    Π
e  -0.557  -12.082  0.000 
  CA  -0.214  -3.564  0.000    CA  -0.212  -3.933  0.000 
  GBR  -0.392  -12.136  0.000    GBR  -0.298  -5.395  0.000 
Canada  const  5.285  17.943  0.000  Portugal  const  5.644  9.346  0.000 
  Π
e  -0.561  -13.562  0.000    Π
e  -0.685  -26.644  0.000 
  CA  0.027  0.422  0.673    CA  0.371  8.736  0.000 
  GBR  -0.351  -8.788  0.000    GBR  -0.771  -10.086  0.000 
Denmark  const  6.086  20.367  0.000  Spain  const  4.748  6.404  0.000 
  Π
e  -0.361  -7.029  0.000    Π
e  -0.595  -13.076  0.000 
  CA  -0.435  -6.633  0.000    CA  0.008  0.097  0.922 
  GBR  -0.467  -11.140  0.000    GBR  -0.724  -6.999  0.000 
Finland  const  9.304  21.059  0.000  Sweden  const  8.516  19.727  0.000 
  Π
e  -1.048  -16.989  0.000    Π
e  -0.847  -17.010  0.000 
  CA  -0.413  -8.572  0.000    CA  -0.476  -8.002  0.000 
  GBR  0.018  0.393  0.695    GBR  -0.090  -2.871  0.004 
France  const  5.152  11.254  0.000  UK  const  6.569  15.468  0.000 
  Π
e  -0.548  -12.871  0.000    Π
e  -0.629  -21.870  0.000 
  CA  -0.374  -5.301  0.000    CA  0.236  2.854  0.005 
  GBR  -0.198  -2.404  0.017    GBR  -0.159  -3.024  0.003 
Germany  const  4.700  17.069  0.000  Japan  const  7.469  14.237  0.000 
  Π
e  -0.381  -8.285  0.000    Π
e  -0.919  -20.591  0.000 
  CA  -0.061  -1.947  0.052    CA  -0.993  -7.246  0.000 
  GBR  -0.062  -1.372  0.171    GBR  0.256  5.033  0.000 
Ireland  const  5.951  17.211  0.000  U.S.  const  6.611  12.136  0.000 
  Π
e  -0.775  -19.682  0.000    Π
e  -0.750  -12.057  0.000 
  CA  0.017  0.408  0.683    CA  0.104  1.137  0.256 
  GBR  -0.489  -13.543  0.000    GBR  0.036  0.496  0.620 
Italy  const  4.209  7.338  0.000           
  Π
e  -0.682  -17.039  0.000           
  CA  0.250  2.588  0.010           
  GBR  -0.498  -8.166  0.000           
Note: linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix. Balanced system, total observations: 612. 
  
To estimate the complete panel error-correction model given in (2) we recover 
from  each  of  the  cointegration  relations  the  estimated  coefficients  to  construct  the 
residual quantity ( ) it it i it i X p g   - -   . Afterwards, we estimate a complete VAR in first 
differences,  with country  effects,  αi, with the necessary lags of the abovementioned 
residual variable. The lag length structure k is chosen using the Schwarz and Hannan-
Quinn selection criteria, and by carrying out a standard likelihood ratio testing-down 
type procedure, to examine the lag significance from a long-lag structure (started with 
k=6) to a more parsimonious one. In order to improve the statistical specification of the 
model, we systematically implemented Wald tests of exclusion of variables from the 
short-run dynamic (not reported here) to eliminate insignificant short-run estimates at 
the  5%  level.  The  results  of  the  estimations  using  Full  Information  Maximum 
Likelihood are reported in Table 4.   7 
 
Table 4 – Error-correction estimates for D rit 
X1= (Π
e, CA, DR), short-run parameters 




 it-3  Dp
e
 it-4 
-0.2910  0.137722  0.229459  0.08515  0.190028 
[-7.49]  [2.47]  [7.07]  [2.47]  [5.76] 
Loading factord          
0.163733         
[3.13]         
 
X2= (Π
e, CA, GBR), short-run parameters 




 it-3  Dp
e
 it-4 
-0.198459  0.195994  0.059376  0.138118 
[-4.79]  [5.04]  [2.00]  [3.60 
DCAit-1  DGBR it-4     
0.164672  -0.15368     
[2.87]  [-2.34]     
Loading factord        
0.128283       
[2.39]       
Note: total observations, 560; t-statistics in brackets.  
r – real long-term interest rate; CA – current account balance; p
e – inflation surprises; DR – debt ratio; 
GBR – budget balance ratio.  
 
Inflation has a significant short-run effect on real long-term sovereign yields, and 
a fall in inflation would imply a decline in real rates. Interestingly, the long-run effect 
associated with the panel results (Table 4), can in this case be computed to be around -
0.4. This is in line with the long-run cointegration relationship reported for the countries 
in the previous SUR analysis, and implies that an increase in inflation surprises of 1 
percentage point could lead to a long-run decline of around 0.4 percentage point in the 
real long-term interest rate. Regarding the short-run effects of the fiscal determinants, an 
improvement of the government budget balance also reduces the real interest rate.  
 
4. Conclusion 
We studied the long-run behaviour of sovereign yields for OECD countries, for 
the period 1973-2008. The use of a dynamic panel approach allowed to reflect financial 
and economic integration, and to increase the performance and accuracy of the tests. In 
this framework, cross-country dependences in the sovereign bond segment of the capital 
markets were also taken into account. 
We rejected cross-section independence for the real long-term interest rates (and 
for its determinants). From an economic point of view such cross-section dependence 
provides evidence of capital markets integration in the OECD. After having established   8 
with 2
nd generation panel unit root tests that all the series in the panel are I(1), we 
undertook a bootstrap panel cointegration analysis.  
Finally, our analysis shows that better government budget balances mostly reduce 
real sovereign yields, while higher sovereign indebtedness increases them. Additionally, 
deteriorating current account balances, signalling a widening gap between savings and 
investment, push sovereign yields upwards. 
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